Examines how the practice of both art and faith necessarily order man to transcendent fulfillment, yet do so in very different ways. The book examines the analogical nature of art and faith; reflects on the nature of art as a virtue perfecting human creativity; contemplates the purpose of the work of art as revelatory of truth; and explores how the arts become debased when their practice rejects the goal of beauty.

The notion of justice implies that what is given is owed to the recipient; charity, on the other hand, acknowledges the reality of a free gift that is not owed to the recipient. This difference is obscured in contemporary liberal societies where, because of the absence of transcendent metaphysical commitments, the demandsof social justice replace charity. A Thomistic analysis, however, recognizes a metaphysical order as the basis for justice. This order limits the sphere of justice and so allows for acts (...) of charity motivated by love for God. If we do not recognize this distinction, we reduce all charitable acts to acts of justice and therefore ignore themost important debt of all: the debt humans owe to God that can only be repaid by loving Him and our neighbor. (shrink)

This paper considers recent arguments from Jürgen Habermas and Charles Taylor that argue that even secular societies ought to tolerate religion for its practical benefits. Then, taking inspiration from Thomas Aquinas, I critique their positions as misconstruing the nature of religion in two fundamental ways. First, we must distinguish generic religion as a natural virtue from diverse species of faith that go beyond the duty to render homage to the First Cause. It will be seen that, generically, religion is integral (...) to the common good inasmuch as it is essential to the perfection of the intellect’s search for truth. Second, from this it follows that religion ought not be justified in utilitarian terms of extrinsic benefit; rather, the good of religion is the intrinsic realization of the activity itself. In light of these correctives, I conclude that even secular societies ought to encourage religious belief, while remaining open to a variety of faiths. (shrink)

There is a dilemma at the heart of the moral life, in that we often appeal to the Decalogue as being the basis of a common morality, yet it is impossible to justify these precepts as self-evident. I resolve this dilemma in light of Aquinas’s analysis of the relation between the self-evident precepts of the natural law and the Decalogue. The self-evident precepts (that man should live in society and should know and love God) follow directly from human nature. The (...) precepts of the Decalogue indicate how those goods are to be pursued in the context of just social relations. It is this contextualization in terms of just relations that prevents them from being self-evident and, correspondingly, requires their revelation. Since the commandments act as invitations to pursue the good without the defects of injustice, they are the most manifest condition for achieving the end of human happiness. (shrink)

There is a dilemma at the heart of the moral life, in that we often appeal to the Decalogue as being the basis of a common morality, yet it is impossible to justify these precepts as self-evident. I resolve this dilemma in light of Aquinas’s analysis of the relation between the self-evident precepts of the natural law and the Decalogue. The self-evident precepts (that man should live in society and should know and love God) follow directly from human nature. The (...) precepts of the Decalogue indicate how those goods are to be pursued in the context of just social relations. It is this contextualization in terms of just relations that prevents them from being self-evident and, correspondingly, requires their revelation. Since the commandments act as invitations to pursue the good without the defects of injustice, they are the most manifest condition for achieving the end of human happiness. (shrink)

In this paper I explore Aristotle’s idea of epikeia, or equity, in relation to the contemporary abortion debate. Equity is the rule of justice that insists we gobeyond the letter of the law in those cases in which following it would be harmful. One consequence of this is that we do not need to create exceptionless laws,since laws can admit exceptions for the sake of a higher good. I argue that this arrangement appears to be a reasonable way to move (...) the abortion debate forward, since the common good would mandate the prohibition of most abortions, but applications of equity would protect access to abortion for those considered most in need. In the end, though, despite this reasonableness, its usefulness for reforming abortion law is limited due to the current hostility of the American legislature to natural law as a higher form of justice. (shrink)